North East Journal of Legal Studies
Volume 2 Spring 1994

Article 7

Spring 1994

Babes in Briefs: Is The Education of Infants A Necessary?
Robert S. Wiener

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.fairfield.edu/nealsb

Recommended Citation
Wiener, Robert S. (1994) "Babes in Briefs: Is The Education of Infants A Necessary?," North East Journal
of Legal Studies: Vol. 2 , Article 7.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.fairfield.edu/nealsb/vol2/iss1/7
This item has been accepted for inclusion in DigitalCommons@Fairfield by an authorized administrator of
DigitalCommons@Fairfield. It is brought to you by DigitalCommons@Fairfield with permission from the rightsholder(s) and is protected by copyright and/or related rights. You are free to use this item in any way that is
permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses, you need to obtain
permission from the rights-holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by a Creative Commons license
in the record and/or on the work itself. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@fairfield.edu.

94

95

formed by an infant is voidable-at best, that is, valid but
able to be avoided by the infant. 5
The public policy
rationale for this rule is that infants, as a matter of law,
do not have the capacity to fully appreciate the obligations
of a contract and "the law still guards the interests of
minors against their own asswned improvidence and want of
sound judgment 116 and from others who might take advantage of
them.
BABES IN BRIEFS:
IS THE EDUCATION OF INFANTS A NECESSARY?
by

Robert

s. Wiener*

INTRODUCTION
This
paper
the
legal
and
equitable
ramifications1 and sociological implications2 of education as
a necessary for infants.
What determines an infant's
contractual liability? How does the law reflect and affect
the societal role of infants?
What is its view of the
education of infants and social classes, parental power, and
gender? How has it or should it have changed?
Even if an infant disaffirms a common law contract, the
court of equity may recognize a quasi-contract if the subject
matter is a necessary. can education be a necessary so that
an infant is liable for its procurement? As a matter of law,
the answer depends on whether the education is common school,
arts,
religious,
college,
professional,
such
as
apprenticeships,
pharmacy,
stenography,
aviation,
and
correspondence courses, or from books.
If the type of
education can be a necessary, the trier of fact considers
parental approval, job training, cheaper alternatives, and the
social status, special suitability, and educational background
of the infant to determine whether it is a necessary for the
particular infant.
I.

COMMON LAW CONTRACTS

An infant (also called a minor) is a person who lacks the
capacity to contract due to youth. The age of contractual
capacity, twenty-one at common law, 3 has been statutorily
reduced to eighteen by most states. 4 A common law contract
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An infant .can disaffirm and thereby avoid contracts for
lack of contractual capacity before achieving majority and for
a reasonable time thereafter. 7 To disaffirm, the infant must
be in privity of contract. An adult who forms a contract for
an infant intended third party beneficiary cannot assert the
infant's right of disaffirmance.
In keeping with the rule
that legal rights are one's own, if an adult permits an infant
to contract or creates a suretyship contract to obtain a
contract for an infant, the infant's right to disaffirm is not
barred. 8
Age misrepresentation by an infant, innocent or
fraudulent, generally will not prevent disaffirmance of the
contract. 9
An infant who disaffirms a contract must give back any
consideration received, but need not place the other party in
status quo and that is not possible if the property received
during infancy has been spent, consumed, or destroyed.
Regarding intellectual benefit derived from education, an
infant 11 is not precluded from disaffirming the contract and
recovering the consideration that he paid, by the fact that he
cannot return the instruction received. " 10 However, materials,
such as books received for a correspondence course, must be
returned . 11
A
contract formed by an infant may be expressly
or impliedly ratified when the infant gains contractual
capacity at the age of majority. Implied ratification results
from failure to disaffirm within a reasonable time of becoming
a :major.131z A reasonable time period may be as long as thirteen
months.
Infants who act like adults by marrying,
children, or enlisting for war, may be held to have made valid
common law contracts under case or statutory law. 14
some
states have reduced the age of contractual capacity for
educational loans to sixteen by statute. 15 The theory may be
that infants wise enough to appreciate the value of higher
education should have contractual capacity.
This paper
focuses on contracts made by infants who lack contractual
capacity.
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II.

QUASI-CONTRACTS
A. creation

Infants can avoid all common law contractual liability.
This principle standing alone .would make: parti.es reluctant to
form any contracts with
those for
necessaries. Therefore, the court of equ1ty.has
power to
create a fictional quas i -contract when the d1saff1rmed common
law contract was for necessaries for
infant:
"And the
reason anciently assigned was, tha\ wl.thout
power he
might be exposed to perish of want." 6 'r,he equ1table r7medy
for non-performance of a quasi-contract l.S quantum meru1t or
reasonable value.
contracts and quasi-contracts sho.uld be
distinguished. "[A)n unexecuted
f.or necessar1.es
be disaffirmed unless it be otherw1se
Even executed contracts for necessaries can be
A common law contract, once disaffirmed, is not binding • Of;11Y
an equitable quasi-contract created in the
o! necessar1es
is unavoidable.
Application of these
can be
confusing and, therefore, warrants
In
Rhode Island case of Pardey v.
Co.,
Frank B. Pardey contracted with the
company on 17 April 1893 "to work for the (Company) 1n the
pattern-making business for the term of three years and a half
•••• n19
Pardey was to be compensated with a salary and
"reasonable and proper instruction as a pattern maker. The
contract further provided that the sum of $1 per
from the
wages earned should be retained by the [ Company]
the 7nd
of the term and should then be paid to (Pardey], w1th
interest
the end of each year, but that if (Pardey]
should leave the employment before the end of the term, ?r be
discharged for cause, the money retained should be
At the time of entering the employment (PardeXJ
a_m1n?r
[eighteen years old] .... (Pardey) attained hl.s
1n
July, 1895, and lef t the defendant's employment
hl.s own
accord september 7 1895. The amount of wages retal.ned under
I
20
the contract ... is $124."
Frank B. Pardey disaffirmed the contract.
The court
decided that 11 [Pardey] is mistaken in his supposition that the
contract was voidable; for, though it is true generally that
a minor cannot bind himself by his contracts, for want . of
legal capacity, it is equally well
that he may b1nd
himself by a contract for necessaries, l.f reasonable, or by a
contract beneficial to him. 1121 A modern court would decl.de
that Pardey could avoid a common law contract created when he
was an infant.
The court found that the contract was for necessaries and
"As the contract was binding on (Pardey ) , and he has violated
it by leaving the employment, he must be considered to have
forfeited the wages retained as provided by the contract
n22
A modern court would find that a disaffirmed common

law contract is not binding and cannot be breached.
A
liquidated damages clause, such as the forfeiture clause here,
is avoided with the contract. If the instruction received by
Pardey was a necessary, he is "bound11 only to a quasi-contract
and owes the company quantum meruit, the reasonable value of
consideration received. and not returned. The court would find
that the "wages retained" were "wages earned" and award them
to Pardey as quantUll\ l!leruit or, perhaps, on a theory of
constructive bailment.
As with common law contracts, an infant, to be liable on
a theory of quasi-contract, must be in privity of contract for
the necessaries. If an obligation is assumed by a relative or
friend to benefit an infant, the infant is an intended third
party beneficiary of the contract formed and not personally
liable. "It is essential to recovery that necessaries shall
have been furnished on the credit of the inf ant. If furnished
on the credit of his parent or guardian, he is not liable.n23
Therefore, the New York Court of Appeals held that "since the
primary duty of support of an infant is on his father, the
action for necessaries could not be maintained against the
infant (because) the complaint does not allege that the
services were rendered in reliance on the infant's credit
(nor] that the services were performed at the request of the
1124
infant
A few cases relieve an infant of liability for
necessaries even in quasi contract if an adult with legal
responsibility for the infant is ready and willing to provide
them. Even if a contract was formed by the infant, "an infant
living with his father or guardian who is able and willing to
furnish him with every thing suitable and necessary to his
position in life cannot make a binding promise to pay even for
necessaries. 1125
In general, an infant who disaffirms a contract for
legally necessary education is liable in quasi-contract. If
the education is not a necessary, a disaffirming infant is
free of both legal and equitable liability. Whether education
can be a necessary is determined as a matter of law by its
type. Whether possibly necessary education is a necessary for
a particular infant is a matter of fact.
B. Can This Type of Education Be a Necessary?

What is a necessary? "(T]he law has never limited its
definition of the term necessaries to those things which are
strictly essential to the support of life,--as food, clothing,
and medicine in sickness. " 20
Can education be a necessary? According to Blackstone,
an infant may be obl i gated for "necessary meat, drink,
apparel, physic and such other necessaries ; and likewise for
his good teaching and instruction, whereby he may profit

99

98

himself afterwards. "27
If "profit" is the test of goc;>d
teaching and instruction, is it limited to
or
include non-monetary rewards? Most courts ask
the
"would be better enabled to earn a
as a
of the education.
However, one court
playing was a necessary despite no short-term
benefits. 29
Necessaries are distinguished from non-necessaries or
luxuries .
To be a necessary, education "must be actually
necessary, in the particular case, for use, not mere ornament,
for substantial good, not mere pleasure; and must belong to
the class which the law generally pronounces necessary .for
infants . u30
If the education is in fact
th1ngs
essential to its proper study are also
What class of education may be ·a necessary?
English case law, "I have no doubt
the proper.educatJ.on
of an infant stands in the same pos1t1on
EnglJ.sh
as
32
food and clothing supplied to him. "
case law .1s in
accord. "The authorities are agreed that .a p_;oper educatJ.on is
a necessary." 33 What is a proper educat1on.

1. common school Education
In 1844, the Vermont supreme court in Middlebury
v. chandlerl" stated that "a good common school educatJ.on,.at
the least, is now fully recognized as one of
for an infant. Without it he would lack an acquJ.sJ.t1.on.wh17h
would be common among his associates, he would suffer
h1s
subsequent influence and usefulness in society,. and would ever
be liable to suffer in his transactions of
. . such an
education is moreover essential to the
dJ.s?harge
of civil, political, and religious duties."
Th1s
of
common school education is accepted as a matter of law.
What is a good common school education?
The supreme
court in virginia, in
found "that it is a.reasonaJ;lle
inference" that an infant who "was studying EnglJ.sh,
Greek and mathematics" from age ten to thirteen "had
a fair education • .,37 Additional education was not cons1dered
necessary.
What is today's equivalent of a
common schc;>ol
education? The answer probably is a "publ:Lc school and
school" education . 38
2. Arts Education

can education in the arts be a necessary? In Sisson v.
Schultz, 39 Burt Sisson, "a piano turner [sic ) " sued
Schultz for $5 for tuning a piano at the request of Schultz s
wife and daughter. 40 "The father had provided piano lessc;ms
for [his 12 year old daughter] and at the time she was tak1ng

one lesson a week. The piano was out of tune, no question of
that and there is testimony, undisputed, that for the daughter
to pursue her studies and become proficient in music, the
piano had to be kept in tune •.•• [T)here is evidence that it
had not been tuned for two or three years. 1141 Although the
only precedent was that instruction in music and painting was
not a necessary, 42 the trial court judge apparently found that
piano tuning could be a necessary and submitted the question
to the jury which decided that it was. The supreme court of
affirmed stating that the question of whether a piano
tun1ng was a .necessary was "a close one" and the trial court
had not reversibly erred.
3. Religious education

. "No cases can be found either in England or in any of the
Un:Lted States where the definition of instruction [of infants)
has
been
carried so
far
as to
include religious
instruction. " 43
"(T]he rent of a pew in a church where
divine worship is held and religious instruction given is·
(not) included in the list of articles known to the common law
as necessaries." 44 In this 1873 Connecticut case, the pew was
rented for the wife and a daughter of the defendant without
his authority or assent. 45 The judgment of the court seems
at least in part, to result from reluctance to classify
teaching of all religions as a necessary. "And indeed in this
where there is no established church and every one is
to worship God according to the dictates of his own
conscience, no distinction could be made among the thousand
different tenets and precepts that are tau2Pt upon the sabbath
under the name of religious instruction."
Perhaps, if such
a distinction could constitutionally be made, this court would
have found some religious instruction necessary.
4. College education

Can college education be a necessary?47
The 1844
Middlebury College case distinguished between a good common

school education and collegiate study. The court found that
a college education could not be a necessary for "it is
obvious that the more extensive attainments in literature and
science must be viewed in a light somewhat different . Though
they tend greatly to elevate and adorn personal character, are
a source of much private enjoyment, and may justly be expected
to prove of public utility, yet in reference to men in general
they are far from being necessary in a legal sense. The mass
of our citizens pass through life without them •..• I speak
only of the regular and full course of collegiate study. " 48
More recent cases have been more open to finding that a
college education could be a necessary.
The 1912 New York
Court of Appeals observed that "circumstances . . . may exist
where even [a classical or professional ) education might
properly be found a necessary as matter of fact . n 49 In 1930,
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the supreme Judicial court of Massachusetts stated in
that "under present day conditions, .as in the past [cl.tl.ng
Middlebury college), a college education is not, as matter of
law · a necessary" but "very likely circwnstances could be
which would warrant that conclusion as matter of f<:ct. •:so
The supreme court of Michigan noted in
that
l.t
has been held in several cases that a h 1gher or
professional education is not a necessary,. the hol dl.ng 1s
usually qualified by the statement that c1rcumstances may
exist where such an education may be a necessary as a matter
of fact. nS1
In modern society, does a college
come within
the legal definition of a necessary? The
College
court's observation that a common school education "is now"
fully recognized as a necessary implies that it
not
so and that other education might be so recogn1zed 1n the
future. That case's tests of what is common among associates,
the lack thereof resulting in suffering in
influence and usefulness in society; and being ever 11able to
suffer in business transactions may apply today to a college
education. 52
In fact an increasin& number of
on all levels now
require
educati on. 5 Society has
changed
since 1844 and 1930 to find a college educat1on a legal
necessary. 54
s. Professional education
The Middlebury College ruling that college.
cannot be a necessary d i d not apply to all
the col'Ql'l\on school.
As the court said, ''I would not be
understood as making any allusion to professional studies, or
to the education and training which is requisite to the
knowledge and practice of mechanic arts. These partake of the
nature of apprenticeships, and stand on pecul1ar grounds of
reason and policy. " 55
a. Apprenticeships: Apprenticeships can be necessary.
under the apprenticeship contract
Paraey, he.,"was to work
for the (Company) in the pattern-mak1ng
for a
11
and "reasonable and proper instruction as a
·.
The court referring to Middlebury College, dec1ded that
is a contract for necessaries, and is beneficial to the
plaintiff
since it stipulates for his instruct i on in the
useful art of pattern making, by which he would be better
57
enabled to earn a livel i hood. "

b. Pharmacy: As the supreme Court of Iowa said, "it is
conceded that a course in pharmacy may come within the
definition of necessaries for which a minor may be bound by
contract. n58
In this case, the male infant "entered the
pharmacy department of Highland Park College . . . for a course

of 12 weeks' instruction" and 11qu:{t
the school soon
thereafter" suing only "to recover the unearned portion of the
sum so paid. " 59 Therefore, the issue of whether the course was
indeed a necessary was not raised.
c. Stenography: A course in
stenography" can be a necessary. 60

"the science or art of

d. Aviation: The Brooklyn Municipal court of New York
decided in 1934, as · a matter of law, that "aviation
instruction to prepare an infant to be a mechanic is a
contract for necessaries. 1161 On the other hand, the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts correctly decided in 1938 that
education in elementary aviation, as a limited commercial
pilot and as a transport pilot was not a necessary as a matter
of law, but possibly as a matter of fact. 62
e. Correspondence courses: What of mail-order education
correspondence
In 1909, a Maine trial court judge
instructed the jury that "a course of correspondence
instructi on in the electrical engineering course •.. seems to
stand on intermediate ground, being between that of a trade
and a learned profession." 64 The jury decided that here such
education was a necessary and the appellate court affirmed the
decision.
6.

Books

Education can also be gained directly from books.
The
Michigan Court of Appeals decided as a matter of law that
reference books can be necessaries. 65

B. Is This Education a Necessary for This Minor?
Whether a type of education that can be a necessary is a
necessary in a specific case is a question of fact. "What is
a
proper education in a given case depends on the
circumstances of the case. " 66 Some factors considered may stay
in the jury room, but 11 The practical meaning of the term
[necessaries ] has always been in some measure relative, having
reference as well to what may be called the conventional
necessities of others in the same walks of life with the
infant,
as to his own pecuniary condition and other
circumstances. n67

Par ental Approval
Parental approval is a criterion for determin i ng if
education i s a necessary.
In 1912, New York's Court of
Appeals said of unapproved enginee ring educati on, "the
[infant) resided with a parent or guardi an able and anxi ous to
give him any kind of an education that he desired, and that in
defiance of parental authority he perversely took his own
course to his injury and the overthrow of family disci pline. 1168
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Therefore, if the infant and the parent or guardian disagree
on the infant's education, the parent or guardian can prevent
the infant from forming quasi-contracts for education. The
infant is thereby given additional protection -- able to avoid
quasi-contractual as well as common law contractual liability.
The practical effect is that a party contracting with an
infant to provide otherwise necessary education to that infant
must first get parental or guardian approval or risk not only
disaffirmance of the contract, but loss of a quantum meruit
claim for the education's reasonable value.
The rationale
seems to be that what is necessary to an infant is best
determined
parents and guardians: 11 Honor your father and
your motheru and "Father knows best. 11 Surely, parents should
decide what education for their children they want to fund,
but the public policy served here is parental discipline, not
the necessary education of infants.ro

2. Job Training
courts often consider job training the prime purpose of
education, 71 that is, education t'by which he would be better
enabled to earn a livelihood. 1172 If it will not achieve this
goal, the education is not a necessary.n This view ignores
education for the "intelligent discharge of civil, political
and religious duties. 1174
3. Cheaper Alternatives

Courts consider the existence and quality of free or
cheaper alternatives to the chosen education relevant to
determine what constitutes a necessary.
Is private education a necessary if free public education
is available? In the 1902 case of Cory v.
the Rhode
Island court did not believe "that, simply because the state,
through its public-school system, furnishes the facilities for
a common-school education, the father cannot be held liable
for anything in the way of supplemental or additional training
for the child.
I f the child lives in a city like
Providence, for instance, where, under its very superior
system of public schools, which system includes both mental
and manual training, he can obtain at the public expense an
education which is probably equal, if not, indeed, superior,
in practical value to a college education of a century ago, it
may perhaps be doubted whether the father could be legally
held liable for anything in addition thereto in the way of
educational training. But where, as in the case at bar, the
child lives in a country town, the schools of which do not
furnish, and cannot be expected to furnish those facilities
for a broad education, including a business or commercial
training, which many city schools do furnish, we do not think
it would be reasonable to hold that the father, by reason of
the existence of public schools in the town, is necessarily
relieved from all liability for the additional training of his

child. 1176
Eugene F. Bear, an 18 year old infant, executed a $265
promissory note for board and tuition for one session of
common school education at Randolph Macon Academy. Whether
"the sending of a boy to a distant academy, or boarding
school, when there was a good public school and high school
convenient to his home" was necessary was held a question of
fact with "ample room for different conclusions to be drawn
therefrom by reasonable
The Virginia supreme Court of
Appeals in 1921 approved putting the question to the jury.
Under the facts of In re Johnstone's Estate78 , the infant
perhaps was found by the jury to have had cheaper
alternatives. Robert B. Johnstone Jr. nwas at the top of his
class in high school. ui'9 He attended Dartmouth College in
Hanover, New Hampshire paid for by a bank loan to his parents.
u (T)here was available to the minor a full tuition scholarship
to the University of Chicago. The [trial) Court could have
found from the evidence that the minor might have received
from Dartmouth either a scholarship or a loan on more
favorable terms than the one received from La Salle National
Bank. 11 The appellate court affirmed the jury's decision that
a Dartmouth College education was not a necessary.
Judicial review of consumer judgment contrasts with the
law's hands-off policy on most business judgements. A court
might even decide that public school education is more
beneficial to the student than private school education. 00
4. Social status

The infant's social status can determine whether a type
of education is a necessary. "(T)hat such an education and
training as will fit one for the ordinary duties of life in
the sphere in which he moves ••• should be so classed (with
necessaries), we have no doubt. u 81 11 [I )t is then for the jury
to
whether, under all the circumstances, the things
were actually necessary to the position and
condition of the infant •••• n 82 For example, college education
might be a necessary if there are "extraneous circumstances
.•. such as wealth, or station in society .••• u83
What is a necessary is relative, as the 1909 Maine
Supreme Judicial Court said, determined 11 by taking into
consideration the infant 1 s state and condition in life ••.
what might be considered necessaries for one infant would not
be so considered for another whose status is different as to
rank, fortune, and social position. The question is one to be
determined from the facts surrounding each particular case. u 84
In 1912, the New York Court of Appeals reiterated this
reasoning. S!>
Edward Connelly subscribed for a course of
correspondence instruction in "Complete Steam Engineering" for
$75.20 payable in $5 monthly
The court stated
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that "(t]he word 'necessaries,' as used in the law, is a
relative term • • . and depends on the social position and
situation in life of the infant as well as upon his own
fortune and that of his parents. What would be necessary in
a legal sense for an infant with ample means of his own might
not be so for one with no means at all. " 87 In American case
law, one's means determine one's needs.
The 1844 Virginia Supreme Court applied this principle
and agreed with the lower courts that the infant E.C. Hayes's
"circumstances and · prospects in life did not call for or
justify further outlay in his education and support; and that
common sense and prudence required that he be put to some
business, so as to support himself.nM Here, the step-father
"and his wife chose to maintain this boy ... , and to clothe
him finer than other youths in the neighborhood, and give him
a classical education, and furnish him with a riding-horse and
other equipments for his pleasure; all these were luxuries and
accomplishments; but, in no sense of the word, or of the law,
could they be called or construed to be necessaries. " 89 Don't
get too uppity, says the law. Get a job.
The wealth of an infant or the infant's parents alone
will not assure the proving of a necessary, especially if the
contract is ancillary to a questionable necessary and the
parents are ready and willing to pay. In Moskow v. Marshall, 90
a landlord sued for quantum meruit on the lease by two minors
of a "suite of rooms in 'a privately owned dormitory
••. used
exclusively for students at Harvard College'. " 91 Not only
the plaintiff prove that the living quarters were 11 essentl.al
to a college course 11 , 92 he has to prove that the college
education itself was a necessary. In this case, Richard B.
Marshall and Lewis R. Burchill entered their second year at
Harvard College in September 1928. The court considered their
financial resources.
"Burchill prepared for college at an
academy 'located one hundred twenty miles from his home, where
the annual fee was $1,050.' The father of ••• Marshall is
associated with a firm or corporation 'in the bond
business. tu93 But, it is not sufficient to find that 111 (a)
college course was not extravagant or unreasonable in respect
of either defendant, considering his father's means and manner
of living and his own prospects in life,' do not go far enough
for this purpose. The affirmative fact of necessity is not
established
by
the
negation
of
extravagance
and
unreasonableness. tt 94 The landlord lost.
Using social status to determine whether education is a
necessary for an infant has troubled only the Supreme Judicial
court of Massachusetts in a 1938 case governed by New York
law, and then not enough to reverse the trial court's
decision. "(John P. Adamowski's] father was a weaver. The
money which the plaintiff (infant] paid was in part saved by
himself from his manual labor and in part contributed by his
family from their savings.
In this country
any

stratification of society is transient and shifting. Many a
young man without capital or influential connection attains
education and advancement in life through his own labors. It
would be hard to say that education in aviation was less
necessary for the plaintiff than it would have been for
another more affluent.... The judge found that the courses in
instruction were not necessaries for the plaintiff.
That
finding
was
proper,
though
possibly
not
required
as
matter
of
law. n 95
Perhaps the court wanted to avoid a finding that the
education was a necessary which would have prevented, at least
in part, the infant's recovery of the $1,600 he had paid.
The courts give great weight to social status. Education
necessary for one infant may not be necessary for another with
equal educational background and intellectual ability, but
lower social status. Why do most courts seem to accept fixed
social classes? Is the law recognizing a psychological need
developed by habituation to a certain style of life? Are
necessaries determined by the class into which one is born and
infants discouraged from aspiration and motivation for
improvement? Are lower classes not expected to be educated
above their current status? Or are less affluent infants
being protected from liability beyond their financial means,
whereas the wealthy can afford imprudent expenses?* Should
infants of lower social status go to work rather than get more
education? Is that advice wise? Is money spent on education
a poor investment, or is it in fact an effective way to
elevate social status?
Or does the law ratify the selffulfilling prophecy that all those who have not yet achieved
higher soc.ial status have not because they cannot?
5. Special Suitability

Special suitability of an infant for particular education
might also be considered.
For example, "that he exhibited
peculiar indications of genius or talent, which would suggest
the fitness and expediency of a college education for him,
more than for the generality of youth in community. 1197 Also,
in Sisson, "The daughter was 12 years old, showed aptitude for
music, and was the pianist of the neighborhood. tt 98 on the
other hand, ordinary proficiency, even in Harvard College, is
not sufficient; uNor does the fact that the defendants were
able to continue in college until the second year of the
course prove that .for them a college education was
necessary. tt 99
6. Educational Background

An infant's educational background may be used to
determine whether further education is a necessary.
The
Georgia Supreme Court considered in 1906 11 the particular
sphere in society or calling in life which her previous
education and attainments had prepared and fitted her to
occupy or fill. n 100
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In the International Text-Book Co. v. Doran101 case of
1907, James w. Doran, not yet 21, signed a contract for
written instruction "of a preliminary and suitable nature in
arithmetic, algebra, geometry, and mechanical drawing ••.. He
had previously spent two years in a high school." The supreme
court of Errors of Connecticut held that "Education furnished
to an infant may be necessary to him, but only when it is
suitable to his wants and condition. Whether education of a
merely preliminary character, such as was furnished in the
present case, was a necessary to one who had spent two years
at a high school, was a question of fact •••• " 102 The court
appears to think that although the instruction may be part of
a good common school education, Doran should have learned the
material the first time around.
The finding may be that
remedial education is not a necessary.
7.

Gender

The babes in briefs are our hope for the future.
In
society their education, including a college
necessary and should be recognized as such by
the law.
ENDNOTES
1.

Judges deciding contracts cases usually rely on recent
opinions from the same jurisdiction. In this area of the
law, perhaps due to the relatively small number of reported
cases, courts often cite old opinions from other
jurisdictions; therefore, all cases discussed are treated as
belonging to a single body of law.

2.

This paper deals with contract law, but a growing body of
cases considers if education is a necessary to an
and therefore the legal responsibility of the parent
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When an agent, acting within the scope of his authority
on behalf of a principal, enters into a contract with a third
party, the agent is usually not liable to the third party for
the
contract's performance . 1
However,
under certain
circumstances, an agent may be liable as a party to the
contract. The purpose of this article is to discuss the rules
of agency law which determine the liability of an agent who
acts within the scope of his authority. 2 In the first part of
this article, · I present the general rules in the abstract.
Next, I discuss the theoretical justifications for an<;i the
theoretical difficulties with these rules.
Specifically, I
attempt to point out the theoretical difficulties which arise
when these rules are applied to cases where an agent
negotiates a contract on behalf of a business which,
unbeknownst to the third party, is owned by someone other than
the agent, or if owned by the agent, is incorporated.
I
suggest that, in such cases, agent liability may result even
where it is not a fair conclusion that the third party or the
agent manifested an intent for the agent to be liable or that
the third party relied on the liability of the agent.
Finally, I discuss an approach found in a few cases which
denies agent liability whe.r e it is not a fair conclusion that
the third party dealt with the agent as an individual, rather
than as an agent, or relied on his individual liability.
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